We revisit the complexity of deciding, given a (finite) strategic game, whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist

We introduce two new natural decision problems, denoted as ∃ RATIONAL NASH and ∃ IRRATIONAL NASH, pertinent to the rationality and irrationality, respectively, of Nash equilibria for (finite) strategic games. These problems ...

We consider the problem of routing n users on m parallel links, under the restriction that each user may only be routed on a link from a certain set of allowed links for the user. Thus, the problem is equivalent to the ...

In this work, we continue the study of the many facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, henceforth abbreviated as the FMNE Conjecture, in selfish routing for the special case of n identical users over two ...

In a distributed system with attacks and defenses, both attackers and defenders are self-interested entities. We assume a reward-sharing scheme among interdependent defenders

We study Nash equilibria in a discrete routing game that combines features of the two most famous models for non-cooperative routing, the KP model [16] and the Wardrop model [27]. In our model, users share parallel links. ...

Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses)

In this work, we introduce and study a new, potentially rich model for selfish routing over non-cooperative networks, as an interesting hybridization of the two prevailing such models, namely the KPmodel [E. Koutsoupias, ...

In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well-studied KP model [18] for selfish routing that reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop model [31]. In the new model, user traffics are still unsplittable, ...

Consider a network vulnerable to security attacks and equipped with defense mechanisms. How much is the loss in the provided security guarantees due to the selfish nature of attacks and defenses? The Price of Defense was ...